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PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF "UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL" LAWS: REVIVING THE ROYAL 
PREROGATIVE. Christopher N. May.1 Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 215. Cloth, $59.95. 
J. Randy Beck2 
No President should lightly disregard an Act of Congress. 
The Constitution, which vests authority in the President, also di-
rects him to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. "3 
Pragmatic considerations reinforce the constitutional duty. Per-
ceived disobedience to a statutory command carries significant 
legal and political risks, a point illustrated by Andrew Johnson's 
impeachment on the charge that he violated the Tenure of Of-
fice Act.4 
But does the Constitution require the President to honor 
legislation he reasonably believes to violate the Constitution?5 Is 
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute consistent with the 
President's oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitu-
tion of the United States"?6 "Yes," answers Professor Christo-
pher N. May to both questions in Presidential Defiance of "Un-
constitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative. 
Presidential Defiance contributes to an ongoing debate over 
the legitimacy of a practice that Judge Frank Easterbrook has 
termed "presidential review"- the asserted power of the Presi-
dent to refrain from executing a statute deemed to overstep con-
I. James P. Bradley Professor of Constitutional Law, Loyola University, Los An· 
geles. 
2. Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank 
Michael Stokes Paulsen and especially my colleague Dan T. Coenen for many helpful 
comments on this book review. 
3. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 3. 
4. William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice 
Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson 226-27 (William Morrow and Co., 1992). 
By one vote, the Senate failed to convict Johnson in the impeachment trial. Id. at 234-35; 
John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage 139-40 (Harper & Row,1961). 
5. Andrew Johnson's defense in the impeachment trial rested in part on the claim 
that the Tenure of Office Act was unconstitutional. (pp. 59-60) The Supreme Court 
later agreed with Johnson's position that the statute was unconstitutional. Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) ("the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it 
attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been ap-
pointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid"). 
6. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 1, cl. 8. 
419 
420 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 16:419 
stitutional boundaries.7 Updating an article first published in the 
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly,8 May has produced a use-
ful piece of scholarship, likely to be cited in future legal tests of 
the presidential review power. Particularly helpful is May's 
compilation of 145 instances between 1789 and 1981 in which 
presidents questioned the constitutionality of a statute, and his 
investigation of the outcome of each incident. (pp. 53-139) 
May argues that the Founders intended the President to im-
plement Acts of Congress, notwithstanding constitutional scru-
ples. The asserted presidential review power was not exercised 
until long after the founding, May contends, and is foreign to the 
Framers' world view, which was shaped by the history of rela-
tions between the English Crown and Parliament. Only reluc-
tantly does May posit a potentially justifiable use of the presi-
dential review power, in cases where presidential "defiance" is 
the only means of bringing a statute's constitutional defects to 
the attention of the courts. (pp. 143-49) 
Notwithstanding the valuable contribution made by May's 
historical research, this reader remains unpersuaded.9 May con-
vincingly maintains that the Framers denied the President any 
general power to dispense with the execution of properly-
enacted laws-a power arguably asserted by the Nixon admini-
stration, for instance, when it claimed constitutional authority to 
"impound" funds appropriated by Congress.10 May's argument 
loses steam, however, when applied to a President's good faith 
refusal to implement a statute on constitutional grounds. I will 
begin with a brief recitation of one argument for presidential re-
view and then consider some of May's principal counter-
arguments. 
7. Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905 (1989-
90). 
8. Christopher N. May, Presidential Dejimu:e of 'Unconstitutional' Laws: Reviving 
the Royal Prerogative, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 865 (1994). 
9. I should admit the potential for bias on my part, which arises from a nine-month 
stint with the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). OLC deals fre-
quently with questions of presidential power and has provided much of the legal advice 
underlying recent claims that the President may refuse to enforce unconstitutional stat-
utes. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Legal Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel to 
the Honorable Abner J. Mikva (Nov. 2, 1994) (reprinted in 48 Ark. L. Rev. 313 (1995)). 
Having been steeped in the outlook and culture of OLC at an impressionable age, I may 
find the theory of presidential review more inherently plausible than other readers. 
10. Note, Jmpourulrnent of Funds, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1505,1512-16 (1973). 
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I 
The theory of presidential review bears a strong family re-
semblance to judicial review, its doctrinal sibling. Consequently, 
one standard argument for presidential review tracks the justifi-
cation for judicial review offered in Marbury v. Madison. 11 Chief 
Justice Marshall, in the final pages of his Marbury opinion, con-
siders the sources of "law" a court may consult in resolving par-
ticular cases or controversies. A court may, of course, look to 
acts of the legislature that appear to govern the dispute. But 
does the Constitution also supply "law" applicable in judicial 
proceedings? 
Marshall concludes that the Constitution represents "para-
mount law."12 The Constitution is an act of the sovereign people, 
by which the powers of the legislature are defmed and limited. 
Principles expressed in the document are therefore fundamen-
tal.13 In case of a conflict between a statute and the Constitution, 
the latter necessarily prevails. "[A)n act of the legislature, re-
pugnant to the constitution, is void." 4 
Just as the courts must determine the applicable "law" in 
fulfilling their judicial functions, the President must undertake a 
parallel inquiry to perform his executive duties. The Constitu-
tion requires the President to "take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed."15 But which "laws" come within the President's 
constitutional duty of faithful execution? If we adhere to the 
reasoning of Marbury, then the Constitution itself contains 
"law" that the President must faithfully execute. Since "a legis-
lative act contrary to the constitution is not law,"16 the Presi-
dent's duty of faithful execution does not extend to an unconsti-
tutional statute. 
Marshall buttresses his argument for judicial review by 
noting that a judge takes an oath to support the Constitution. 
II. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For arguments analogizing presidential review to 
judicial review, see Easterbrook, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 919-20 (cited in note 7); Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the 
Law Is, 83 Georgetown LJ. 217,244-45,257-62 (1994); Gary Lawson and Christopher D. 
Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1306 
(1996). 
12. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178. 
13. ld. at 176. 
14. ld. at 177. 
IS. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 3 (emphasis added). 
16. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
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This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to Uudges'] 
conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it 
on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the 
knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to sup-
t? port! 
The same considerations would seem no less applicable to the 
President, who takes an oath to "preserve, protect and defend 
the Constitution of the United States."18 According to advocates 
of presidential review, it would be equally immoral-and no less 
anomalous- to require a President who swears to "preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution"19 to execute an unconstitu-
tional statute. 20 
II 
In rejecting a presidential review power, May draws upon a 
history of conflict between the English Crown and Parliament 
prior to the founding of this country. Over the centuries, British 
monarchs asserted a prerogative power to "suspend" a statute-
interrupting its legal effect-or to grant "dispensations," which 
permitted designated persons to ignore the law. The courts up-
held such assertions of executive power, concluding that Parlia-
ment lacked authority to restrict the royal prerogative.21 
The dispute over these royal prerogatives reached a crisis 
when King James II began granting dispensations and suspen-
17. ld. at 180. 
18. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 1, cl. 8. 
19. ld. 
20. In response to the argument based on the Oath Oause, May quotes David 
Strauss: 
It is perfectly plausible to say that the Constitution sometimes requires the 
president to enforce a law that he considers, on balance, to be unconstitutional. 
If that is what the Constitution requires, then the oath requires the president to 
enforce the law-not to defy the law in pursuit of his own interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
(p. 17) (quoting David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 113, 121-22 (1993)). Of course, a similar response could be made to Chief 
Justice Marshall's argument in Marbury. If we read the Constitution as requiring judges 
to apply even laws they deem unconstitutional, then to do so would not violate the 
judge's oath. Marshall, however, saw no room for this accommodation, at least with re-
spect to the judicial oath. Perhaps one could distinguish the executive from the judiciary 
based on the Take Care Oause (pp. 16-18), but it is not clear why the presidential oath 
should be treated as fundamentally different from the oath taken by judges. 
21. See, e.g., Godden v. Hales, 89 Eng. Rep. 1050, 1051 (K.B. 1686) (the court con-
cluded "that the Kings of England were absolute Sovereigns; that the laws were the 
King's laws; that the King had a power to dispense with any of the laws of Government 
as he saw necessity for it; that he was sole judge of that necessity; that no Act of Parlia-
ment could take away that power"). 
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sions of legislation directed against Catholics and Protestant dis-
senters. The result was the abdication of James II, the corona-
tion of William and Mary and the promulgation of the English 
Bill of Rights.22 (pp. 3-8) Accusing James and his "evil counsel-
lors, judges, and ministers" of an attempt to "subvert and extir-
pate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of this 
kingdom," the English Bill of Rights abolished the suspending 
power and limited the di~nsing power to situations where it 
was authorized by statute. 
This English restriction of the royal prerogative, according 
to May, makes it improbable that the Framers intended to create 
a presidential review power. He outlines the argument in the 
first paragraph of chapter 1: 
When the president refuses to honor a law on the ground that 
it is unconstitutional, he exercises a power indistinguishable 
from the royal suspending and dispensing powers-two of the 
most formidable prerogative powers once wielded by the 
British Crown. From the Middle Ages through the late seven-
teenth century, the kings and queens of England routinely 
suspended or dispensed with laws, often on the ground that a 
law was unconstitutional. After centuries of struggle between 
the Crown and Parliament, the suspending and dispensing 
powers were forever stripped from the English Crown by the 
Bill of Rights of 1689. In the United States, however, as the 
twentieth century draws to a close, presidents have increas-
ingly claimed that they now possess the virtually identical 
power to ignore allegedly unconstitutional laws. (p. 3) 
May contends that the Constitution grants no explicit power of 
presidential review and should not be read to create an implied 
executive power that was denied the British monarch. There-
fore, argues May, the President has no power to refuse enforce-
ment of the laws, even if he believes them to be unconstitutional. 
(pp.ll, 21) 
The flaw in May's argument lies in the premise that the 
royal suspending and dispensing prerogatives are "indistinguish-
22. George Burton Adams, Constitutional History of England 351-61 (J. Cape, 
1948). See generally Carolyn A. Edie, Revolution and the Rule of Law: The End of the 
Dispensing Power, 1689, 10 Eighteenth Century Stud. 434 (lm); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr. 
and Matthew Kramer, The Glorious Revolution of 1688 (visited Feb. 12, 1999) 
<http://www.lawsch.uga.edu/-gloriousl>. I would like to thank my colleague, Donald E. 
Wilk~s, Jr., for lending me his collected research materials on the suspending and dis-
pensmg powers. 
23. 1 W & M, Sess. II, ch. 2 (1689). 
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able" from or "virtually identical" to a power of presidential re-
view.24 The English suspending and dispensing prerogatives 
were general powers that could be exercised as the monarch saw 
fit in the name of the public good.25 As one defender of these 
prerogatives argued, "there must be some Power always in be-
ing, to Suspend, or Dispense with such Law, or Laws, as Publick-
Good, the Safety of the People, or emergent Necessity require."u, 
Thus, the suspending and dispensing prerogatives gave the 
Crown broad power to supersede policy judgments of Parlia-
ment on policy grounds. By contrast, defenders of presidential 
review make no claim that the President may ignore a statute 
because of a difference of opinion with the legislature. Rather 
the President must honor a congressional enactment unless it 
contains an identifiable constitutional violation. The theoretical 
justification for presidential review limits its application to in-
stances where Congress purports to exercise authority it does 
not possess. Thus, even if we reject (as we surely should) a 
sweeping presidential power to suspend or dispense with laws on 
policy grounds, it does not follow that we must reject the very 
different and far narrower power to refuse execution of uncon-
stitutional statutes. 
To prove the point, we need only revisit our analogy to judi-
cial review. The Founders did not intend the federal courts to 
exercise a general power of suspending or dispensing with stat-
utes for reasons of policy.27 Nevertheless, assuming Marbury is 
rightly decided, the Founders did intend the courts to exercise 
the lesser power of judicial review. We thus may agree with May 
24. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1306 (cited in note 11) (critiquing an 
earlier version of May's work by distinguishing a general power of suspension from a 
presidential review power limited to unconstitutional statutes). 
25. There were certain exceptions to the suspending and dispensing powers. For 
instance, the monarch could not dispense with a prohibition against an act malum in se. 
(p. 6); Sir Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King 178 (D.E.C. Yale, ed., Selden So-
ciety, 1976); Richard Langhorne, Considerations Touching the Great Question of the 
King's Right in Dispensing with the Penal Laws 1 (Garland Publishing, Inc., 1976); Joseph 
Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown; and the Relative Duties 
and Rights of the Subject 95-96 (J. Butterworth and Son, 1820). But such exceptions in no 
way altered the basic character of the suspending and dispensing powers, which, when 
they were applicable, afforded the Crown a general authority to disregard laws as a mat-
ter of discretionary judgment. 
26. Langhorne, Considerations Touching the Great Question of the King's Right in 
Dispensing with the Penal Laws at 3 (cited in note 25) (emphasis added). 
27. Alexander Hamilton anticipated that the judiciary would "take no active resolu-
tion whatever" in the creation of policy, exercising "neither force nor will but merely 
judgment." Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Wilmoore Kendall and George W. Carey, eds., 
The Federalist 464 (Arlington House, 1966). 
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that the Framers denied the President a general power to sus-
pend or dispense with statutes on policy grounds, without ac-
cepting his conclusion that they thereby foreclosed a Marbury-
like power of presidential review. 
In any event, while May is surely correct that the relation-
ship between the Crown and Parliament influenced the Framers' 
deliberations regarding the powers of the President, we must 
guard against too readily transplanting the rules of one constitu-
tional system into the other. The United States Constitution, af-
ter all, departs in significant respects from the British model. 
One critical difference is that the unwritten British constitution 
rests upon a principle of "Parliamentary sovereignty," under 
which no one may review a properly-enacted statute. As ex-
plained by a standard treatise on English Constitutional Law: 
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither 
more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament [defined as 
"the Queen, the House of Lords, and the House of Com-
mons ... acting together"] has, under the English constitu-
tion, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, fur-
ther, that no person or body is recognised by the law of 
England as having a right to override or set aside the legisla-
tion of Parliament.28 
Under this principle, no one may invalidate an act of Parliament 
because every person in England occupies a position inferior to 
Parliament in the constitutional hierarchy. There is no power of 
executive review in England for precisely the same reason that, 
in that nation, there is no power of judicial review. In our sys-
tem, by contrast, judicial review is a vigorous institution. This 
fact alone casts a shadow over the historical and analogical ar-
gument based on English practice. 
The deeper point is that the American Constitution reflects 
a fundamentally different political philosophy than its English 
forerunner. The United States Constitution implements a prin-
ciple of popular, rather than parliamentary sovereignty. In this 
country, neither Congress nor any other collection of govern-
ment officials is sovereign. "We the people" are. The institution 
of presidential review, like the institution of judicial review, 
flows from this principle of popular sovereignty. When the 
courts refuse to apply an unconstitutional statute, they are 
28. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 39-40 
(Macmillan, lOth ed. 1959). 
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merely honoring the constitutional directives of the sovereign 
people. It is for this reason, as Hamilton explains in Federalist 
No. 78, that recognition of a judicial review power does not 
"suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power."29 
As he explains: 
It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to 
both, and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its 
statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in 
the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the lat-
ter rather than the former.30 
By the same token, the people hold sovereignty over the execu-
tive. For this reason, in carrying out his executive functions, the 
President owes a higher allegiance to the will of the people ex-
pressed in the Constitution than to the will of Congress ex-
pressed in a statute. In short, the difference between the British 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty and the American princi-
ple of popular sovereignty provides a powerful theoretical justi-
fication for recognizing a presidential review authority under our 
constitutional structure. 
III 
May's argument from English history is supplemented by in-
ferences from the drafting and ratification of the United States 
Constitution. His strongest argument rests on the Framers' con-
ception of the President's veto power. The Framers viewed the 
veto as the primary shield that protected the President against 
constitutional encroachments by Congress. (p. 13) Nevertheless, 
they rejected James Wilson's proposal for an absolute veto, un-
moved by his argument that "without such a Self-defence the 
Legislature can at any moment sink [the Executive] into 
non-existence."31 (p. 13) 
Although the Framers intended the veto to protect against 
unconstitutional acts of the legislature, they purposely qualified 
the veto power. The constitutional override mechanism permits 
Congress, by a two-thirds vote in each house, to reject any con-
stitutional argument supporting a presidential veto.32 May ar-
29. Federalist 78 at 468 (cited in note 27). 
30. ld. at 467-68. 
31. Quoting 1 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 98 
(1966). 
32. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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gues that recognition of a presidential review power would effec-
tively give the President an absolute veto over acts deemed un-
constitutional, despite the Framers' rejection of an absolute veto 
power. (pp. 11-15) 
May's veto-power argument runs into much the same prob-
lem that undermined his argument based on the royal preroga-
tive. The historical materials establish nothing more than a deci-
sion by the Framers to reject an absolute presidential veto 
applicable to all legislation. Yet presidential review authority is 
significantly less intrusive on lawmaking powers than such an ab-
solute veto. Gary Lawson and Christopher Moore, responding 
to an earlier version of May's work, suggest two bases on which 
an absolute veto can be distinguished from a presidential review 
power.33 First, the President may only ignore laws that he in 
good faith believes to be unconstitutional. An absolute veto 
would permit the President to negate legislation for any reason 
whatever.34 Second, if a President ignores a statute, believing it 
to be unconstitutional, it remains on the books and might be en-
forced upon election of a subsequent President with differing 
constitutional views. An absolute veto would deny the legisla-
tion any possible future effect. To these arguments we may add 
a third significant difference between presidential review and an 
absolute veto. The President may only exercise a veto power 
with respect to a complete bill. Presidential review permits the 
President to act more surgically, ignoring only particular provi-
sions of a statute that violate the Constitution while otherwise 
implementing the legislation. Since an absolute veto is a much 
greater intrusion on the lawmaking power than a presidential re-
view power, the Framers' rejection of the former does not imply 
rejection of the latter.35 
33. Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1306 (cited in note 11). 
34. While the Framers viewed the veto as an important protection against unconsti-
tutional legislation, this is not its only purpose. It can also be exercised on policy 
grounds. As Hamilton explained, the President's veto serves "to guard the community 
against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public 
good, which may happen to influence a majority" of Congress. Federalist 73 at 443 (cited 
in note 27). 
35. Indeed, it could be that one basis for rejecting an absolute veto was the expecta-
tion that the President would ignore statutes encroaching on his constitutional authority, 
though I am aware of no direct evidence to support this view. The availability of a presi-
dential review power answers the concern expressed by James Wilson that Congress 
could "at any moment sink (the Executive] into non-existence." See supra text accom-
panying note 31. Wilson subsequently gave a speech in the Pennsylvania ratifying con-
vention indicating that the proposed Constitution would include a presidential review 
power, permitting the President to "shield himself' from unconstitutional statutes. 
Merrill Jensen, ed., 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 450-52 
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May's search for the Framers' views on presidential review 
is hindered by the paucity of discussion of the issue in the 
founding generation. The only direct evidence-contained in a 
speech by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying conven-
tion-cuts against May's position. As Wilson, a member of the 
Constitutional Convention and later a Justice of the Supreme 
Court, explained: 
[T]he legislature, when acting in that capacity, may transgress 
the bounds assigned to it, and an act may pass, in the usual 
mode, notwithstanding that transgression; but when it comes 
to be discussed before the judges-when they consider its 
principles and find it to be incompatible with the superior 
power of the Constitution, it is their duty to pronounce it 
void. . . . In the same manner, the President of the United 
States could shield himself and refuse to carry into effect an act 
that violates the Constitution. 36 
May dismisses Wilson's comments as "a voice in the wilder-
ness."37 (p. 27) This characterization appears, ironically, in the 
course of an argument that the absence of a presidential review 
power should be inferred from "the silence of the Anti-
Federalists," a silence "overwhelming in its implications." (pp. 
26-29) (emphasis added) Because the Anti-Federalists sought to 
portray the President as an elected monarch, May reasons, they 
would have seized on any credible argument for presidential re-
view as a reason to oppose the Constitution.38 (p. 28) But even a 
solitary statement by James Wilson, one of the constitutional 
Framers, seems a stronger basis for drawing inferences about the 
meaning of the document than the silence of the Constitution's 
opponents. Wilson's parallel advocacy of judicial review and 
presidential review offers contemporaneous evidence that such 
an executive power comports with the work of the Framers. 
(Worzalla Publishing Co., 1976); see infra text accompanying note 36. 
36. Jensen, ed., 2 Documentary History of the Ratificalion of the Constitution at 450-
52 (cited in note 35) (emphasis added). 
37. Of course, the original "voice in the wilderness" -John the Baptist-may have 
been lonely, but he was also right, according to the New Testament accounts. See, e.g., 
Matthew 3:1-3, 11:11-14. 
38. May cites no evidence that the Anti-Federalists offered such an argument in the 
Pennsylvania Convention, after James Wilson made his explicit case for presidential re-
view. 
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IV 
Assuming May is correct that a president must obey an un-
constitutional statute, the surprise villain of May's book is Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter. In the chapters of the book devoted to 
presidential practice, May documents 145 instances between 
1789 and 1981 in which a president objected to legislation on 
constitutional grounds. (pp. 127-31) He concludes that the 
president actually refused to comply with the law in only 20 
cases. (p. 127) Of these 20 acts of presidential defiance, seven of 
them-over a third of the total-occurred during the four years 
of Carter's presidency.39 
In all probability, however, Carter takes top honors for 
presidential defiance only because 1981 was the terminal date 
for May's detailed research. For the years 1981-97, May col-
lected data on the number of presidential signing statements 
raising constitutional objections to legislation, but he did not in-
vestigate the subsequent course of conduct in those years to see 
whether the president had complied with the challenged statute. 
May's figures on constitutionally-qualified signing statements 
suggest that Carter was probably outdistanced by both Presi-
dents Reagan and Bush in the category of presidential defiance. 
Carter averaged 7.5 constitutionally-qualified signing statements 
in each year of his presidency, compared with 10.9 annually for 
Reagan and 29 annually for Bush.40 (p. 74) If there is any con-
nection between a president's constitutional rhetoric and his 
conduct in office, it seems likely that Reagan and Bush ignored 
statutory provisions on constitutional grounds even more fre-
quently than Carter. 
One conclusion May draws from his research into presiden-
tial practice is that no president defied a statute on constitutional 
39. By May's reckoning, the Carter administration refused on constitutional 
grounds to honor (1) a statute interfering with Carter's pardon of Vietnam draft resisters 
(pardon power), (2) a ban on editorials by public broadcasters (freedom of speech), (3) a 
statute requiring restoration of certain San Antonio missions (Establishment Qause), (4) 
the War Powers Resolution (Commander-in-Chief powers), (5) a statute forbidding the 
closing of certain consulates abroad (power to appoint consuls), (6) a statutorily-
authorized two-house veto of HEW regulations (presentment), and (7) a statute con-
cerning the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (Appointments Oause). May, 
Presidential Defiance of" Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative at 111-
15, 124-25, 129 (cited in note 5). 
40. Over the course of his first term, President Ointon matched Carter's average of 
7.5 constitutionally-qualified signing statements per year. (p. 74) It would be interesting 
to see whether Ointon's constitutional objections increased after the election of a Re-
publican majority to Congress in 1994. 
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grounds until 1860. The first such offender, according to May, 
was James Buchanan, who ignored a statute requiring assign-
ment of Captain Montgomery Meigs to supervise construction of 
a Washington, D.C. aqueduct (violating the President's Com-
mander-in-Chief powers). (pp. 101-02, 127) May characterizes 
the practice of presidential defiance as a recent phenomenon. 
(pp. 101, 127-30) 
May, however, can make this argument only by adopting a 
minimalist view of what counts as presidential "defiance." By 
May's criteria, for instance, President Thomas Jefferson did not 
"defy" the Sedition Act when he refused to enforce it. After as-
suming the office of President, Jefferson pardoned persons con-
victed of sedition and dismissed the pending sedition prosecution 
of William Duane, even though Duane's prosecution had been 
initiated at the request of the Senate.41 
These acts were motivated entire~ by Jefferson's view that 
the sedition law was unconstitutional. Jefferson explained his 
conduct in a letter to Abigail Adams (whose husband had been 
the target of allegedly seditious publications): 
I discharged every person under punishment or prosecution 
under the sedition law, because I considered, and now con-
sider, that law to be a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if 
Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden 
image; and that it was as much my duty to arrest its execution 
in every stage, as it would have been to have rescued from the 
fiery furnace those who should have been cast into it for re-
fusing to worship the image. It was accordingly done in every 
instance, without asking what the offenders had done, or 
against whom they had offended, but whether the pains they 
were suffering were inflicted under the pretended sedition 
law.43 
An exercise of the pardon power does not necessarily 
"defy" the law under which the recipient of the pardon was con-
victed. Nor does an exercise of prosecutorial discretion neces-
sarily amount to "defiance" of congressional authority. But 
here, the pardons and the withdrawal of charges under the Sedi-
41. James Morton Smith, Freedom's Feners: The Alien and Sedition Laws and 
American Civil Liberties 301,305 (Cornell U. Press, 1956). 
42. Id. at 305. Indeed, Jefferson instructed the prosecutor to determine whether 
any other law could form the basis for prosecution. ld. 
43. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), reprinted in 
Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., 11 The Writings of Thomas Jeffer-
son 42, 43-44 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904). 
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tion Act were explicitly based on Jefferson's decision to treat the 
statute as a legal nullity. This was a deliberate refusal to execute 
a law passed by Congress. While these acts by Jefferson were 
probably unreviewable, that does not resolve the question of 
whether he complied with his constitutional duty to faithfully 
execute the laws. It is difficult to argue that Jefferson did so un-
less one acknowledges that a president may properly refuse to 
execute an unconstitutional statute. Jefferson's conduct presents 
a clear, early assertion of a presidential review power and count-
ers May's conclusion that presidential review is a recent innova-
tion.44 
v 
If a President may ignore an unconstitutional statute, may 
he also ignore a Supreme Court decision that misinterprets the 
Constitution or exceeds the Court's authority? Most advocates 
of presidential review have declined to push the theory this far, 
acknowledging some form of judicial supremacy, particularly in 
the context of Article III cases and controversies. As a practi-
cal matter, then, the legitimacy of presidential review is an issue 
that will probably be resolved (if at all) in court. If the Supreme 
Court ever rejected the presidential review power, the President 
would likely acquiesce. On the other hand, if the Court sided 
44. May discusses the pardons issued by Jefferson, but does not address Jefferson's 
refusal to prosecute under the sedition law. (pp. 22-23, 39) 
45. Easterbrook, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 926 (cited in note 7); Legal Opinion, 48 
Ark. L. Rev. at 315 (cited in note 9) (suggesting president should comply with a statute 
he believes the Supreme Court would view as constitutional, notwithstanding his own 
beliefs to the contrary). On the other hand, Michael Paulsen has argued that the Presi-
dent may act upon his constitutional principles, even to the extent of refusing to carry out 
a contrary court judgment. Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 276-84 (cited in note 11). 
Paulsen's rejection of judicial supremacy echoes the position of Thomas Jefferson in an-
other letter to Abigail Adams: 
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity of the 
sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has given them a right to decide 
for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both magis-
trates are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them. The 
judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine 
and imprisonment; because the power was placed in their hands by the Consti-
tution. But the executive, believing the Jaw to be unconstitutional, were bound 
to remit the execution of it; because that power has been confided to them in 
the Constitution. That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should 
be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to 
decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in 
their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive also, in their 
spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), reprinted in Lipscomb 
and Bergh, eds., 11 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 49, 50-51 (cited in note 43). 
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with the President on the existence of such a power, the debate 
could be expected to shift from its legitimacy to its appropriate 
scope.46 
Professor May's work previews some of the arguments and 
evidence likely to play a role if that future court test ever comes 
to pass. While I was not persuaded by Professor May's analysis, 
Presidential Defiance is a book that merits serious attention by 
those interested in the current debate over presidential review 
authority. 
46. Four Supreme Court Justices signed onto a concurring opinion recognizing the 
existence of a presidential review power. Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Reve'!ue, 
501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). In an earlier case, a panel of the N1~th 
Circuit rejected the existence of a presidential review power, but the en bane court With-
drew and replaced that portion of the panel opinion. Lear Siegler, Inc., Energy Prods. 
Div'n v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1121-26 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn and replaced in part 
en bane, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Ameron, Inc., v. U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers, 1'irl F.2d 'ir75 (3d Cir.), modified, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986). In an alternative sce-
nario, the decisive test of presidential review power could arise in an impeachment pro-
ceeding. 
